● Re: 【讨论】弱势语种的迅速消亡——探讨之二 - 荔园在线 | 深圳大学学生论坛,荔园晨风BBS,深大在线网站

荔园之美，在春之萌芽，在夏之绽放，在秋之收获，在冬之沉淀

发信人: njboy (njnj), 信区: Postgraduate
标  题: Re: 【讨论】弱势语种的迅速消亡——探讨之二
发信站: 荔园晨风BBS站 (Mon Oct 29 23:37:37 2001), 转信

【在 laugon (彼岸重生) 的大作中提到: 】
:     今日在车上听到一个电台谈及当今世界某些语种在迅速消亡（姑且称之为弱势语
: 种），而很多语种则处于消亡的边缘。据语言学家估算，目前全球有 6 万多种语言，
: 但依现在的发展趋势预计，50 年后将剩下大概 3 万种语言。为此，很多语言学家呼
: 吁要从速拯救这些濒危语种。
:     语言学家们提到，语言是人类在自身发展过程中创造出来的文明成果，是文化的
: 积淀，每一种语言都是一笔宝贵的财富。因此，拯救一种语言就相当于拯救一种文化，
: 拯救濒危语言与拯救濒危动物一样重要。
:     对于很多语种的消亡，我确实怀有深深的遗憾。但这种趋势于人类而言，究竟是
: 不是很大的损失，却有着同样有着很大的疑问。在现实社会中，濒危动物之所以濒危，
: 很大程度上是由于人类滥用资源所造成的，而语言的濒危则往往因这种语言自身的适
: 应性差所造成。自然界有其特定的规律，“适者生存”毕竟在目前来看仍然有其不可
: 动摇的合理性—— 一种语言在世界上的存在同样要遵循这样的规律。而一种语言如
: 果是因为其自身的适应性差而走向消亡，人类恐怕也只能接受这种现实。
:     换一个角度看，在全球一体化程度不断深化的情况下，语言过多反而成为人类
: 沟通的障碍。这种体验对于广大学习过外语的人而言都是刻骨铭心的。假如有一天全
: 世界都有了唯一的共同语言，那么全人类的沟通就不存在任何障碍。而这一天的到来
: 对于全人类而言都将会是划时代的。因此，我们又还有必要为这些语种的消亡做过多
: 的哀悼吗？
:     语言学家把拯救语言与拯救生物相提并论，但是他们却忽略了一点：人类可以
: 只用唯一的一种语言在全球交流，却不能只与唯一的一种生物在地球上共存。
:      对于这个话题，或许大家有更好的见解，欢迎跟贴讨论！

laogan关于弱势语言的引论，很可惜未在本版展开讨论，即使难得的几篇回应，我
认为并未切中要意。如果我理解正确的话，laogan的意图是借对语言的目前命运的
惜叹，说明在如今这一全球化的时代，许多如弱势语言一般相对脆弱的特殊性（请
见我的探讨一）应如何自处。就发展中国家及中国人而言，这一点尤其值得深思，
难道我们的体制、文化、传统、行为方式等诸多因素不正是上述特殊性之一吗？难
道我们都未注意这一挑战吗？简单而言，如果我们不重视或不研究全球化中中国所
处的相对劣势，中国的未来是不容乐观的。然而，langan的话题尚未引起类似的共
鸣，甚至出现就语言论语言的回应，很明显，我们深入问题本质的功力尚有欠缺。

全球化是大家均应来关注的现象，研究视角的不同，会使我们对全球化的内涵的理
解进一步加深，这亦是全球化值得关注的主因，也使langan的话题有讨论的巨大空
间，为增强本版的学术性，我们不能辜负langan的苦心。
下述是关于全球化与民主关系的讨论，个人摘自外国刊物，原文较长，已择其精要
，有兴趣的诸位阅之应有启迪，以作抛砖之用。该文其余部分与个人的观点将在（
探讨三）列明：
An enduring tenet of the post-Cold War era is that globalization can
be a catalyst for democratization. In one formulation, when democratic
ideals sweep (or even trickle) across borders into authoritarian states,
globalization makes democratization inevitable. Proponents of this view
point to the contagion of democratic transitions in the world over
the past quarter- century and to the ability of technology to
penetrate the most closed societies. Even the Orwellian North Korean
government, they point out, has gone gingerly online, though the
country's broader population has no electronic access to the outside
world.
But these broad trends cannot yet confirm a strong and direct connection
between globalization and democratization. The evidence is mixed and
will continue to be so for some time. For every society in which a
"people's power" revolution is helped along by international cheering
squads and satellite television, another is daily becoming more
cosmopolitan while adhering to traditional (and often authoritarian)
practices.The city-state of Singapore, rated as "most global" on the A.
T. Kearny/Foreign Policy magazine Globalization Index in terms of
crossborder contact between people, has remained resolutely
semi-authoritarian for the past 30 years and shows few signs of
greater democratization. Moreover, while entire regions, particularly in
the former Eastern bloc, embraced economic globalization and more
open political processes at the onset of the 1990s, by the end of the
decade many new democracies were faltering under the weight of
globalization, whether because of unfavorable economic trends or greater
transnational crime. It may not yet be possible to make a final
judgment about the connection between globalization and democracy, but a
closer look will clarify where globalization has helped
democratization, where it has inhibited movement toward greater
openness, and, assuming an increased pace of globalization, what the
greater flows of people and ideas will mean for the world's
governments and societies in the years ahead.

Toward International Norms of Democracy

Perhaps the most tangible evidence of globalization's impact on
democratization has been the infusion of democratic norms, and the
principles of human rights that support them, into many international
and regional institutions. The principle of accountability for human
rights abuse is increasingly unfettered by national borders, as the 1998
arrest of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in London
demonstrated. The ad hoc United Nations war crimes tribunal that was
convened for the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was extended to
Rwanda in the middle of the decade, presaging a broader move toward
international justice. In the coming decade, the establishment of an
International Criminal Court will be a watershed in that move.
Democratic principles are also reshaping regional institutions. The
European Union, originally an economic community, now requires
democratic government as a precondition for membership and promotes
democracy in its collective foreign policy. The Organization of American
States, once a diplomatic forum for both democratic and nondemocratic
governments, now works actively to restore democracy when it is
imperiled in member states. The Organization of African Unity, also a
traditional diplomatic group, is attempting to forge a regional human
rights code modeled after the Helsinki process in Europe.
But the process has its limits. Regional groups adopt codes of
democratic practice where a quorum of democracies already exists or
where the largest and most economically powerful states are democratic.
In these cases, the weight of the democratic majority (and the benefits
of membership in the club) are sometimes sufficient to help persuade
nondemocratic states to liberalize. But the trend halts abruptly where
the political spectrum includes an equal number of democratic and
nondemocratic states or where authoritarian regimes are predominant.
In Asia, for example, the diversity of political regimes has largely
kept democracy and human rights off the table in the AsianPacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
A more encouraging but more lowlevel trend has been the growth of
transnational nongovernmental organizations devoted to promoting
democracy and protecting human rights. These groups, which usually
originate and are headquartered in Western nations, establish beachheads
(and nurture local counterparts) in authoritarian nations, although
they are seldom able to operate there without significant restrictions.
Thus, in regions where authoritarian trends remain strong-most
notably in Asia and the Middle East-the only networks dedicated to
spreading democratic values and strengthening human rights are
nongovernmental. For the foreseeable future, the best chance of building
intergovernmental democracy and human rights regimes in these regions
will be in a gradual crossover process, as NGO networks pull
government officials into "track two" (mixed government and NGO)
dialogues and other informal exercises.
The Instrumental Effects of Globalization
In regions lacking a widespread and overt commitment to democracy
Western policymakers and nongovernmental groups trying to promote
greater political liberalization have placed their faith in the indirect
effects of globalization. In this view, globalization offers a bait and
switch. An authoritarian government agrees to a global regime to gain
benefits of one sort (usually economic) but is forced to accept the
political consequences (greater popular pressure for democracy) that
follow. Policies crafted in accord with this theory focus on two aspects
of globalization-international trade liberalization and
telecommunications. Not surprisingly, the theory also supports two
cherished American beliefs: that open markets and democracy are the
inspiration and consequence of one another and that the march of
technology cannot be stopped.
Thus, for more than a decade successive U.S. administrations have
claimed that broadly maintaining trade with China, and specifically
encouraging China's entry into the World Trade Organization, would
provide a backdoor route to political reform. Adhering to WTO rules
would require the regime in Beijing to provide more transparent and
accountable government and would strengthen the concept of the rule of
law, two fundamentals in modern democratic systems. In addition, foreign
telecommunications companies would gain parity with government
companies in China, spreading their technology and loosening the
regime's control over contact between China and the outside world, as
well as among Chinese citizens themselves.
The logic, compelling in the long run, has short-term limits. In
countries with enduring authoritarian regimes, leaders are more likely
to accede to legal reform for pragmatic reasons-to improve economic
conditions through increased international trade so long as the
reforms are not viewed by the populace as ideological capitulation.
Leaders may also consider reforms pertaining to international trade to
be easier to contain, because the initial focus is on commercial codes
that primarily affect foreign business. Although it is possible to
cordon off domestic populations in the early stages of such reform,
the consequences of trade liberalization and marketization eventually
require the regime to adopt a broader approach. But economic
liberalization can also exacerbate problems that seem to outpace legal
reform efforts and even encourage popular support for authoritarian or
semiauthoritarian government. Russia's entry into the international
economy has, in the minds of many Russians, worsened official corruption
and economic crime. As long as these trends are perceived to be
stronger than (even impervious to) reform, citizens are likely to
tolerate less than democratic rule as a short-term solution.
Moreover, some of the economic powers poised to enter international
trade regimes, most notably China, could themselves affect the rules
governing those regimes. Thus far, global trade rules have largely
been written by Western democracies, whose combined economic power has
placed aspiring entrants in the role of supplicants. But the entry of
more "mixed" economic powers-governments committed to market reform
but not necessarily to Western-style democracy-may change these
institutions. At the least, the link between trade preferences and
transparent processes may weaken slightly, as may support for overt
political conditionality linked to trade, in the mode of the European
Union. At worst, global trade institutions could be rent with bloc
behavior, not unlike that sometimes seen in the United Nations.

--
※ 来源:·荔园晨风BBS站 bbs.szu.edu.cn·[FROM: 192.168.33.39]

荔园在线首页友情链接：深圳大学深大招生荔园晨风BBS S-Term软件网络书店